accession negotiations. Article 301 covers the following: 1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisomnent of between six months and three years.
2.A person who publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security organizations shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years.
3 . In cases where denigration of Turkish ness is committed by a Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third.
Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a criIBe.
Article 301 is a not a new concept in Turkey. It was designed to replace Article 159, a similar law that was part of the original penal code heavily influenced by Italian Fascism. Other Turkish articles dealt with similar issues. In the 1980s when Turkey's Ozal government was under international pressure to change Articles 141, 142 and 163 (Articles 141 and 142 were designed to "fight communism," and Article 163 targeted people with religious sensitivities) all were scrapped and Article 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Law was created and used in a similar fashion. So, while Article 301 is certainly not the only part of the Turkish Penal Code that has fallen under criticism for curtailing freedom of expression and political criticism or for its circular purpose of creation (i .e., Articles 318, 305, 216, and 7), it was under the wording of Article 301 that the latest surge of charges against intellectuals and journalists was carried out.
High Profile Cases
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo an has stated that the European Union was consulted during the creation of Article 301 and had no reservations at that time.! Questions and concerns were raised only after the article was used to prosecute some "Armenian personalities" and Turkish Nationals for comments regarding the Armenian Genocide many say took place while the Ottoman Empire was collapsing after World War I.
HRANT DINK
Indeed, one of the first high profile cases of "insulting Turkishness" was against Hrant Dink , editor of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, who asserted that the dramatic increase in the application of Article 301 had more to do with "Armenianness" than "Turkishness". Dink was charged under Article 301 based on an article in his newspaper regarding relations between Armenians and Turks. The court asserted that the article contained a phrase implying that Turkish blood was" dirty". One argument is that Dink's comment was confusing due to his poor Turkish. A translation of his statement reads, '.' poison in the Armenian blood related to the fear and hatred of Turks" by which Dink apparently meant that the "fear and hatred" ofTurks is a poison in Arrnenian blood; however, due to the wording many interpreted his words as saying that Turkish blood itself was accession negotiations. Article 301 covers the following: 1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisomnent of between six months and three years.
Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a criIBe.
High Profile Cases
HRANT DINK
Indeed, one of the first high profile cases of "insulting Turkishness" was against Hrant Dink , editor of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, who asserted that the dramatic increase in the application of Article 301 had more to do with "Armenianness" than "Turkishness". Dink was charged under Article 301 based on an article in his newspaper regarding relations between Armenians and Turks. The court asserted that the article contained a phrase implying that Turkish blood was" dirty". One argument is that Dink's comment was confusing due to his poor Turkish. A translation of his statement reads, '.' poison in the Armenian blood related to the fear and hatred of Turks" by which Dink apparently meant that the "fear and hatred" ofTurks is a poison in Arrnenian blood; however, due to the wording many interpreted his words as saying that Turkish blood itself was http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/12 poison. Dink himself flatly denied any wrongdoing and repeatedly insisted that the article was intended to improve relations between the two groups. Dink was found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison , despite the Prosecutor General's Office obj ections based on the fourth clause 2 The guilty verdict was passed seven to two. In their dissent, the two judges (one of which was the chairman) expressed concern that the verdict reflected a poor understanding of the no rms of the EU regJrding the right to criticize and boldly stated , "There is still fear for expressing tho ught of dissent in Turkey. No opinion, which has been tried and sellt to jail dies. On the contrary. such opini o n finds other suppo rters. One should know that dissent can not be prevented by creating fear for punishment."3 Hrant Dink was sho t three times in the head on the m o rning ofJanuary 19, 2006 , not far fi'0l1l the offices of Agos. The gunman, a troubled young man not yet twenty, is said to have yelled, " I sho t the non-Muslim' " and then £led the scene. H e was later apprehended. Tho usa nds of people m arched in Istanbul in protest of his death, some calling Dink a martyr to the cause of the abolishment of Article 301. Turkish offi cials and international dignitaries alike have expressed deep sorrow tor Dink's death.
RAGIP ZARAKOLU
Around the same time that Dink was brought up on charges, publisher Ragip Zarakolu was charged under Article 301 fo r publishing two books, o ne referring to the mass depo rtations of Armenians in 1915 carrying a seven and a half year sentence and ano ther entitled A n A numiall Doctor ill Turkey carrying a six yea r sentence Zarakolu has ye t to stand trial for.
PERIHAN MAG DEN
A D ecember 2005 newspaper colurnn by Perihan Magden is the basis for another high-profile case. The writer and journalist faced a three year prison sentence fo r the article which strongly defends the idea of conscientious objection and the refusal to perform military service. Conscientious objection is illegal in Turkey and is punishable by imprisolUllent, as is any o ther avoidance of conscription. Magden was acquitted o n June 27 , 2006 when the court ruled that the opinions expressed in the article were covered by fre edom of expression and therefore not a crime.
ORHAN PAMUK
In February of 2005 Article 301 vaulted into the international consciousness when, during an interview with the Swiss publication Das Magaz in , Turkey's renowned author Orhan Pal11uk stated, "Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these lands and nobody but me dares to talk about it."The backlash that followed forced Pamuk to £lee the country. D emonstrations were staged and his books were burned . C harges were brought against hirn upo n his return to Turkey later in 2005 .
Because Pamuk was charged under an ex post fac to law, approval was required from the Ministry of Justice in order to prosecute. That approval n ever came. OnJanuary 22 , 2006 the ministry declared that it had no authority to open a case against Pamuk under the new penal code and thus the charges agJinst Pamuk were dropped. That week the European Union begain their review of the Turkish justice system. Pamuk 's m ost recent novel, Snow, addresses the urgent issues of secularism and religion in a country that has been torn between the two for most of the last century. While his poison. Dink himself flatly denied any wrongdoing and repeatedly insisted that the article was intended to improve relations between the two groups. Dink was found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison , despite the Prosecutor General's Office obj ections based on the fourth clause 2 The guilty verdict was passed seven to two. In their dissent, the two judges (one of which was the chairman) expressed concern that the verdict reflected a poor understanding of the no rms of the EU regJrding the right to criticize and boldly stated , "There is still fear for expressing tho ught of dissent in Turkey. No opinion, which has been tried and sellt to jail dies. On the contrary. such opini o n finds other suppo rters. One should know that dissent can not be prevented by creating fear for punishment."3 Hrant Dink was sho t three times in the head on the m o rning ofJanuary 19, 2006 , not far fi'0l1l the offices of Agos. The gunman, a troubled young man not yet twenty, is said to have yelled, " I sho t the non-Muslim' " and then £led the scene. H e was later apprehended. Tho usa nds of people m arched in Istanbul in protest of his death, some calling Dink a martyr to the cause of the abolishment of Article 301. Turkish offi cials and international dignitaries alike have expressed deep sorrow tor Dink's death.
RAGIP ZARAKOLU
PERIHAN MAG DEN
ORHAN PAMUK
Because Pamuk was charged under an ex post fac to law, approval was required from the Ministry of Justice in order to prosecute. That approval n ever came. OnJanuary 22 , 2006 the ministry declared that it had no authority to open a case against Pamuk under the new penal code and thus the charges agJinst Pamuk were dropped. That week the European Union begain their review of the Turkish justice system. Pamuk 's m ost recent novel, Snow, addresses the urgent issues of secularism and religion in a country that has been torn between the two for most of the last century. While his Article 301 and Turkish Stability comments to a Swedish newspaper unleashed a slew of charges and threats of death and imprisonment, his acclaimed novel was released without incident. Later, on the BBC's Hardtalk , Pamuk indicated that his remarks in Das Magazill were intended to draw attention more to the issue of free speech in Turkey than to the m assacres themselves.
The prosecution of critics and dissenters has few apparent advantages for Turkey. Indeed, each charge compounded by the dissenting voices within the govenU11ent itself. In Dink's case, the Prosecutor General's Office pointed out that the fourth clause makes it clear that criticism is not a crillle, to no avail. Ragip Zarakolu 's case drags on in the courts, postponement after postponem ent, serving only to highlight Turkish dissent and bringing into question Turkey's EU compatibility. Perihan Magden faced a harsh three year sentence fo r an article that was later declared by the courts to be simply a matter of freedom of speech . With Pamuk, the Justice Ministry eventually decla red that they had no authority to try him based on Article 301. At the height of m edia scrutiny was the case of Elif Safak, when the Turkish government deem ed necessary prosecutio n over the remarks of fictional charac ters.
ELiF SAFAK
Safak, as with Pallluk. had the charges against her driven forward by "ultra-nationalist" lawyers, indicating that while the apparent campaign to protect "Turkishness" is not one initiated by the conservative AKP government it is, however, clearly not an issue that the dominant party would rather address. In September 2006 the then heavily pregnant Safak stood trial for only a few minutes before her case was thrown o ut. In an October 2006 interview on NPR 's A ll Thillgs Considered, Safak gave her view that the real target of her trial was not herself but instead Turkey's European Unio n accession bid. The novel , The Bastard C?f Istallbul, became a bes tseller in its Turkish release.
Public Reaction
As evidenced above, several of the charges filed under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code quickly became high profil e m edia frenzies. In Turkey, Ultra-nationalists were riled by the controversial statements of those on trial. More liberal fa ctions (mainly pro-EU) were o utraged by Turkey's willingness to try the cases. Of the latter, there are many who believe, both within Turkey and internationally, that the charges bro ught forth under Article 301 were not filed in order to protect "Turkishness" or even to stifle dissenting opinions but instead to serve the purposes of the ultra-conservative "old-guard" who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and keeping Turkey o ut of the European Union. 4 In other cases it seems that politicians view Article 301 as a non-issue ; that is, som ething that is not necessary to gain power and som ething that has many apparent disadvantages to address. M ost government officials attempt to downplay the effects of Article 301, the main defense being that no one has ever been imprisoned under Article 301. "Now we can say 'no' -but there is someone who was shot and who died," M ehmet Tezkan wrote in Vatan newspaper. "Then [the ministers] will be silenced."5 While Hrant Dink 's death was directly perpetrated by an angry youth, the yo uth was apparently recruited by Yasin H ayal, a man with an ultra-nati onalist agenda who had served eleven years for the bombing of a M cDonald's. Another man, a student involved with Alperen organization (a neo-facist group associated with the ultra-nationalist Grand Unity Party [BBP]) , was also apprehended and charged with instiga ting and organizing the murder.
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The BBP denies any involvement in the killing. All three m en lived in Trabzon, a city known for ultra-nationalist re cruitment. Were these men the link , the condu ctors between a culturally embedded wa riness o f free speech and an ultra-natio nalist sector of the public galvanized against the EU and its implications? And did Dink, a man who shortly befo re his death wrote in Agos that "The m emory of my computer is fill ed with angry, threatening lin es . . . "6 become a lightening rod for that fury? For many in Turkey, Dink is considered a hero. The hate mail flowin g into his inbox is a stark indica ti o n of the division Turkey has t~l ce d for decades. On one side, ultra-nationalists seethe at the perceived European yoke. O n the o ther, those who suppo rt the EU bid ra ce to grow and change Turkey with ever lI1creasll1g urgen cy.
Erkan Mumcu, leader of the Motherland Party, indicated his belief that, "Certain circles try to create a Turkish profile of attacking innocent doves."7 H e called the killing a plo t to create a fundam entalist Turkish image. H e did not distinctly specifY who was behind the plo t tarnish Turkey's image, but he did reference a rem ark m ade by Dink inte rring that E uropeans were the real reason for the fi:iction between Turks and Armenians in addition to alleging nepotism and corruptio n within the Turkish government.
In the wake of Dink 's death the death threats seemed to have passed on to Pamuk. Whil e being escorted in a courtroom, Yasin Hayal sho uted out for Pamuk to "be smart" , implying that ifPamuk w as n ot carefi.II he could suffer the sam e fate as Dink. Pamuk is now also getting a lot of ultra-nati o nalist hate m ail similar to mail received by Dink. As a precaution, Pamuk is n ow under close protection (protection that Dink was refused).
Public reaction to the murder has been tremendo us. While Dink 's murder is certainly a blow to the outlook of free speech in Turkey, it has also inspired many to exercise free speech to its fullest. Aside from the tho usands upo n tho usands of demonstrators that walk in Dink's funeral processio n h olding signs in Kurdish , Turkish and Armenian that read " We are all Armenian . We are all Hrant Dink", there were also those holding "301 is the m~ll·de re r" placards. Mainstream newspapers all over Turkey are united in their outrage at Dink's murder and their condernnation for Article 301. The public pressure to do away with Article 301 is rising. But so is the ultra-nationalist pressure.
A301 & EU Accession
Many Turks view EU accession as a lost cause, irrelevant, and are more concerned that the EU will ban their favorite fast food chain than with edu cation , social security, health iss ues, etc. Some of Turkey's po pulo us feels that the EU is treating Turkey unfairly, fo rcing them to jump through hoops they wo uld not otherwise have to jump through if they were no t a Muslim nation, if they were no t Turkey. There is strong concern abo ut a European C hristian bias towards Turkey, som e even saying "Christian Values" is the new accession criteria, especially after the September 22, 2006 conunents of Bavarian President Edmund Stoiber (leader of the Christian Social Union Party [SU] , which has strong ties with Germany's ruling Christian Democratic Union). Stoiber proposed that deliberations o n Turkey's accession be ended , citing what he thought to b e gross overreaction of Turkish leaders to Pope Benedict's conunents on Islam. He is also qu oted as saying, "Turkey is not Europe nor does it belong to the continent, because the country has such great cultural and spiritual differences with western values."8 It has been alleged that Germany's government shares this view but cannot com e o ut in support of it due to diplomatic constraints.
In response, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sedat Laciner, head of the Ankara-based USAK m ade some scathing remarks. "If the EU is only a Christian club, I think Turkey should not be part of it. Because Turkey is a secular country and I am personally against to be part of a Middle Ages understanding." Laciner goes on to call "Christianity-based Europe" a "narrowminded organization", and warns that Turkey should stay away from the "discriminative structure and religious fundamentalism" of Europe. He also compared Mr. Stoiber to Osama Bin Laden in "seeding religious hate" and compared Turkey's current position with that of Europea n Jews before World War II. "We want to see a more just and more balanced EU," Mr. Laciner added. "We want to establish a common future instead of obsessing with the biases of the past."9 Turks grow restless at the strain of change and the insistence that, when change occurs. it is not enough. They feel that enough is enough, that there is no hope for accession. These are the sentiments that are feeding the ultra-national surge in Turkey. 1 0
The conservative Muslim AK party has struggled to bring Turkey closer to EU accession. In the interest compliance with the Copenhangen political criteria the 1982 Turkish constitution underwent extensive amendment in October 2001 and May 2004 with eight " harmonization packages" passing the Turkish Parliament in the interim. Article 90 of the Turkish constitution was amended per EU recommendations in order to establish the supremacy of international human rights conventions over domestic law. The civilian control over the military was irnproved during this time as well , putting the budget back in the hands of parliament and allowed closer scrutiny of the Turkish Armed Forces. Spending for education was increased and now exceeds military spending. Many other reforms involving the openness of government procedures and the strengthening of civilian control have also been enacted.
A301 Supporters
The AKP's main opposition, the Kemalist CHp, is against further EU reforms. Their attitude is made it clear in a statem ent by their deputy Orhan Eraslan, mem.ber of the justice conunission of Turkish parliament: "301 is not wrong. It should not change. It is not only a need, it is also a necessity. If we want to remain as a nation and state, it should remain."l l In addition, Republican People's Party (CHP) leader D eniz Baykal said, "The prime minister is looking for an accomplice to the shameful act of making it free to insult the Turkish identity in Turkey. H e almost expects us to apologize for being Turkish. We will not apologize." 12 The Nationalist Movement Party's (MHP) support of Article 301 has not waivered either. Mehmet Nacar, vice secretary-general of the MHP, has asserted that criticisms of Article 301 intentionally disregard the fourth clause ("Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.") which Nacar claims is an indication of a hidden agenda to destory Article 301 in order to degrade Turkishness with impunity.
Sinan Aygiin, president of the Ankara Chamber of Conmlerce, is not only a supporter of Article 301 but has called for a harsher version . Aygun reviewed the article with a group of experts and presented a report to Minister of Justice Cemil <;:ic;:ek saying just that.
<;:ic;:ek, the architect of Article 301, has been harshly criticized by the media . Many believe that <;:ic;:ek is blocking any move to reform Article 301. In his own defense or perhaps the article's, <;:ic;:ek has responded that the many critics of Article 301 have failed to read its text. " These people do not know the previous law and the changes in it. They do not realize what kind of implications a change in this article will provoke in this country," 132 ELIZABETH WHITE UC Santa Barbara some scathing remarks. "If the EU is only a Christian club, I think Turkey should not be part of it. Because Turkey is a secular country and I am personally against to be part of a Middle Ages understanding." Laciner goes on to call "Christianity-based Europe" a "narrowminded organization", and warns that Turkey should stay away from the "discriminative structure and religious fundamentalism" of Europe. He also compared Mr. Stoiber to Osama Bin Laden in "seeding religious hate" and compared Turkey's current position with that of Europea n Jews before World War II. "We want to see a more just and more balanced EU," Mr. Laciner added. "We want to establish a common future instead of obsessing with the biases of the past."9
Turks grow restless at the strain of change and the insistence that, when change occurs. it is not enough. They feel that enough is enough, that there is no hope for accession. These are the sentiments that are feeding the ultra-national surge in Turkey. 1 0
<;:ic;:ek, the architect of Article 301, has been harshly criticized by the media . Many believe that <;:ic;:ek is blocking any move to reform Article 301. In his own defense or perhaps the article's, <;:ic;:ek has responded that the many critics of Article 301 have failed to read its text. " These people do not know the previous law and the changes in it. They do not realize what kind of implications a change in this article will provoke in this country,"
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/12 <;::i<;:ek said. 13 <;::i<;:ek also said that the text of the law is not so important as h ow the prosecutors use it or how the judges interpret it. H e claims that even if Article 301 was abolished, if prosecutors or judges had "bad intentions" they could simply substitute Article 216 and continue unabated.
Minister of Tourism Atilla Ko<;:, while in supportive of Article 301 , does not believe that the problem of Article 301's va uge text is entirely relevent and that the real issue lies in the rnethod of jurispridence.
Prim e Minister E rdo an is not comfortable with the idea of abolishing Article 301 altogether, nor is he comfortable with the connection of Article 301 to Hrant D ink's murder. H e has asserted that only change in the article could be the increased penalty in the third clause for a Turkish citizen insulting Turkishness in another country.
A301 Reform
At this time a joint proposal for the amendment of Article 301 has been submitted to the Turkish gove rmnent. It has already met with great criticism ; some say it is more of a retreat to Article 159 than an improvement, including Ruling Justice and D evelopment (AK) Party deputy leade r Dengir Mir M ehmet Firat who called the proposal a " throwback" in terms of m entality. 14 Economic Development Foundation (IKV) head D avut Okutcu, spokesperson for the group, denies this accusation. T he p roposal retained the notion of "Turkishn ess" but repla ced "insulting" with "derision or 'hurling invective"'. It also included reduced penalties for the offense and puts special emphasis on the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and defines "Turkishness" under Article 66 o f the Constitution, which defines " Turkishness" as people who are tied to the Turkish R epublic with a bond of citizenship are called Turks. 15 The proposal is mainly criticized for its fa ilure to bring clear legal definition to an infamo usly manipulated article.
The proposal was prepared by IKV, Turkish Union of Chambers and ConmlOdities Exchanges (TOBB) , Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) , Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD) , Turkish Confederation of Employers' Unions (TISK) , Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is), Labor Confederation (Hak-Is), Civil Servant Unions Confederation (Memur-Sen), Turkish Broadcasters Association (TVYD) and Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers (TZOB). Of the twelve participants, the R evolutionary Workers' Labor Union (DISK) and the Turkish D octors Union (TTB) disapproved of the outcome, saying that the law should b e struck down altogether. Justice Minister Cemil C icek himself was critical of the proposal , accusing those involved of overlooking his call to work on a concrete proposal.
In response to the proposal, Turkish Solidarity Council Spokesperson Mustafa E rkal , held a joint press conference in support of the current article. The Turkish Solidarity Council is made of nearly 100 civil groups invested in the preservation of Article 301. Others expressed outrage that supporters of the article are b eing depicted as h aving encouraged the murder of Hrant Dink and accused the European Union of having double standards, referen cing similar laws on European books. Ankara C hamber of C Onll11erCe (ATO) Chair Sinan Aygun pointed out that the article protects those who want to annul it.
Largely ignored by the Turkish and the international press alike is the issue of the fourth clause of Article 301. The fourth clause is utilized almost arbitrarily and while it should h ave a serious impact of the interpretation of the law, judges, prosecutors and the press often ignore it in their discussions. Obviously, those in support of Article 301 most <;::i<;:ek said. 13 <;::i<;:ek also said that the text of the law is not so important as h ow the prosecutors use it or how the judges interpret it. H e claims that even if Article 301 was abolished, if prosecutors or judges had "bad intentions" they could simply substitute Article 216 and continue unabated.
At this time a joint proposal for the amendment of Article 301 has been submitted to the Turkish gove rmnent. It has already met with great criticism ; some say it is more of a retreat to Article 159 than an improvement, including Ruling Justice and D evelopment (AK) Party deputy leade r Dengir Mir M ehmet Firat who called the proposal a " throwback" in terms of m entality. 14 Economic Development Foundation (IKV) head D avut Okutcu, spokesperson for the group, denies this accusation. T he p roposal retained the notion of "Turkishn ess" but repla ced "insulting" with "derision or 'hurling invective"'. It also included reduced penalties for the offense and puts special emphasis on the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and defines "Turkishness" under Article 66 o f the Constitution, which defines " Turkishness" as people who are tied to the Turkish R epublic with a bond of citizenship are called Turks. 15 The proposal is mainly criticized for its fa ilure to bring clear legal definition to an infamo usly manipulated article. Of the twelve participants, the R evolutionary Workers' Labor Union (DISK) and the Turkish D octors Union (TTB) disapproved of the outcome, saying that the law should b e struck down altogether. Justice Minister Cemil C icek himself was critical of the proposal , accusing those involved of overlooking his call to work on a concrete proposal.
Largely ignored by the Turkish and the international press alike is the issue of the fourth clause of Article 301. The fourth clause is utilized almost arbitrarily and while it should h ave a serious impact of the interpretation of the law, judges, prosecutors and the press often ignore it in their discussions. Obviously, those in support of Article 301 most Article 301 and Turkish Stability conmlOnly mention it, but they too do not spend too mu ch time analyzing the benign clause. The fact that within the controversial Article there is a clause protecting "expressions of thought intended to criticize" should be a good indication of Turkey's progress but in practice in ends up as a red herring.
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Article 301 is definitely of great concern to the EU with regards to Turkey's accession. A report issued fi'om the Commission to the European Parliament and Council in regards to the enlargement process anno unces that, "It is necessary to ensure freedom of expression without delay by repealing or amending Article 301 of the Penal Code and by overall bringing the legislation into line with European standards."16 Article 301 is seen to be in violatio n of the Copenhage n Criteria, mainly regarding " human rights and respect for and protection of minorities".
The EU trusts Turkey to solve its internal free speech issues. Beyond the amendment or repealing of Article 301, there is not much in the progression of free speech in Turkey that the EU feels it can (or indeed , is required to) effect.
Similar EU Laws
There is criticism of the EU within Turkey regarding their strong stance against However, European concerns stems mainly from the application of the law. Prime Minister Erdo an himself has noted that the European Uni o n did not disapprove of the creation of Article 301. Only after Article 301 was so prolifically applied did the EU raise any objections. Also, it should be noted that while Turkey treats Article 301 as a criminal offense, most of the articles described above are treated as civil offenses.
Calls For Change
European Parliament member Joost Lagendijk sent a letter to both Prime Minister Erdo an and main opposition leader D eniz Baykal asking them to inunediately change Article 301. Within the letter Lagendijk allowed that many EU countries, including his own country, the Netherlands, had laws similar to Article 301. H owever, he also pointed o ut the http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/12 differences in these laws. "First there is th e word 'Turkishness' in the first paragraph of Article 301. .. . T he second point concerns the reasoning behind the article . ... It sho uld serve the o rderly functioning of the public service," explained Lagendijk.1 8 N o ne of the high-profile Turkish cases, h e went on, served this function .
C hiefEU negotiator Ali Babacan asserts that Article 301 is not really the problem but instead an elem ent of the Turkish m entality that allows laws such as Article 301 to be used in a negative fashio n . " Lifting or changing Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code will not change a great deal so long as the players concerned do not change their m enta lity. They w ill simply find o ther articles of the Turkish Penal Code to put to use in the same way." Babacan added, " We are attempting to realize a new philosophy with old playe rs. T lus simply will n ot wo rk." 19
Progress Reports
A report issued o n O ctober 5, 2003 by Arie Oostlander, C hristian Dem ocrati c MP to the European Parliam ent regarding Turkey's progress towards meeting the Copenhagen C riteria (offi cially called "2003 R egula r R epo rt o n Turkey's Progress Towards Accession") recognized and cataloged Turkey's progress as well as addressed issues that still required further reform (or in some cases, any refo rm at all).
T he report focused o n the political system , the judiciary, the role of the nulitary, the status of religio us nl.inoriti es and th eir property rights as well as Turkey's non-compliance with several decisio ns of the E uropean Court of Human Rights. Amo ng some of the majo r concerns of the repo rt were regarding Turkey's "a utho ritarian philosoplues". Mu ch of the Turkish Penal C ode refl ects the influence of Italian Fascism of the 1930s and of particular concern in the repo rt was the 1982 Turkish constitutio n w hich gives the National Security C ouncil (NSC) a wide breadth of p owers incompatible with a civilian dem ocrac y. The report cites NSC's role in the C ouncil of Higher Educati o n (YOK) and the Council of R adio and Televisio n (RTUK) among others extensio ns of military powers into civilian life without sufficient oversight that must be limited (the report also cites va rious amendments from previous "refo rm packages" that w o rked towards this goal, such as abolishing extended powers of the N SC, linuting access to civilian agen cies and increased fiscal transparency) . Also emphasized was the need for Turkey to transfer power from NSC donunated o rganiza ti o ns to civil society associatio ns and encouragement of social dialogue and trade Ul11ons.
Mr. Oostlander's report raised concerns rega rding Article 27 of the C ove nant of C ivil and Political Rights (granting ethluc, religious, and linguistic m inorities the right to pursue their culture, religio n and language). Ag reement to such an article is co ntroversial in Turkey largely due to the ro ughl y 15 millio n Kurds living in the country. Turkey also has laws restricting certain property ri ghts and religio us trailung of Catholic and Protestant churches.
R egarding the Turkish Penal C ode, Articles 312, 169 and 7 (dealing with provocation and threats to " public security" resulting from the advocacy of class, ethluc, religious, linguisti c, and fa cial divisions) were singled out as being used to intimidate, prosec ute and condemn m any Turkish intellectuals and politicians to priso n sentences. C oncerns regarding the impartiality and consistency of judges as well as the lack of proper oversight of prison administrators (a nd therefo re a lack of proper evaluatio n of complaints regarding the treatment of prison ers) were also presented in the report.
T he report m entions that Article 159 (Article 301's predecessor, " insulting the state differences in these laws. "First there is th e word 'Turkishness' in the first paragraph of Article 301. .. . T he second point concerns the reasoning behind the article . ... It sho uld serve the o rderly functioning of the public service," explained Lagendijk.1 8 N o ne of the high-profile Turkish cases, h e went on, served this function . C hiefEU negotiator Ali Babacan asserts that Article 301 is not really the problem but instead an elem ent of the Turkish m entality that allows laws such as Article 301 to be used in a negative fashio n . " Lifting or changing Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code will not change a great deal so long as the players concerned do not change their m enta lity. They w ill simply find o ther articles of the Turkish Penal Code to put to use in the same way." Babacan added, " We are attempting to realize a new philosophy with old playe rs. T lus simply will n ot wo rk." 19
T he report m entions that Article 159 (Article 301's predecessor, " insulting the state
Article 301 and Turkish Stability and state institutions and threats to the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic") had been reformed in 2002, reducing the minimum sentence from on year to six months and including exceptions for expressions of opinion intended only to criticize, and not intended to "insult" and "deride" these institutions. However, it also warns that:
... as announced by the Turkish government, the process of reviewing existing legal restrictions in this area has yet to be completed. In a report assessing the 3 November 2002 elections, the OSCEIODIHR concluded that the broader legal framework and its implementation establish strict limits on the scope of political debate in Turkey. Non-violent expression of political views beyond these limits is still restricted by a variety oflaws and is rigorously enforced. 2o
The report goes on to explain how Turkish prosecutors have a tendency to use alternative provisions of the Penal Code (Articles 312 and 1(9) and the Anti-Terror Law (Article 7) to limit freedom of expression, hinder the freedom of the press (confiscation of press equipment, heavy fines on publishers and internet censorship) as well as to prosecute those who had been acquitted based on the reforms. The report calls for a more consistent and systematic approach to address these issues and all future amended legislation.
The report also leaves no question that Article 90 must be altered to establish the primacy of international law over national law, a critical step to becoming part of the European Union. Mr. Oostlander made it clear in his report that Turkey had work to do before it would meet the Copenhagen Criteria, but clearly stated that "Turkey is able, if it wishes and if it considers it to be in its interest, to transform itself into a first-class EU state."
In its "Presidency Conclusions" on December 16 and 17, 2004, the European Council praised Turkey for its progress and stated that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria enough to open accession negotiations provided it adhered to the recommended reforms. The "Conclusions" made no specific mention of Article 159 (or Article 301, as it did not yet exist).
A report issued November 8, 2006 by Olli Rehn echoed these same concerns, indicating that progress in Turkey has been slow. The outlook of the report was on the positive side. In regards to Article 301, Rehn said:
We state clearly in our report that further reforms are needed, in particular to ensure the freedom of expression. There is an open and intense debate going on in the Turkish civil society on the notorious article 301, calling for its amendment. Prime Minister Erdogan has invited civil society organisations to propose amendments to the Penal Code, which is a welcome initiative. We expect words to lead to deeds, soon. 21
Also in the report Rehn indicates that the best way to deal with Turkey is to be "firm but fair". This is a subtle indication that the EU has no intention of budging on their requirements, no do they have any inclination to let Turkey into the European Union (at least not any time soon).
CONCLUSION
To date, Turkey has failed to initiate all of the reforms advised by the Oostlander Report, most notably the drafting of a new "civilian constitution" (as opposed to Turkey's current "authoritarian" constitution, established in 1982 after a military coup). Reforms http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/12 have been made, such as extensive constitutional amendments geared at meeting the Copenhagen Criteria and the establishment of the supremacy of international human rights conventio ns over domesti c law. However, severe authoritarian elements remain, threatening free speech in its Turkish infancy. The turbulen ce of the past century and influ ence of authoritarian and fascist have long mired Turkey in an ideology of safety over freedom s, exemplified in Orhan Eraslan rem arks o n Article 301.
The AK party has long been a staunch supporter of reform , striving to m eet the requireme nts of the EU and to elevate their country to the global scale. Why then would that same governme nt allow such high-profile campaign against free speech? After all the hard work they've done, after all the progress they've made, w hy block the path they themselves laid? The AKP's current diplomatic/political stan ce on Article 301 is wait-andsee. It is clear, though, that as Turkey nea rs election time, politicians are less and less inclined to address the issu e. As described in the above pages, Turkey is divided on a gradient line b etween freedom of expression, nati o nalism , Europe, integration and the shards of the Ottoman Empire left behind. The polariza tion in Turkey is palpable, in a country w here instability has been a persistent bedfellow, so after so many years of political turmoil and military coups it is understandable why so many would be willing to risk it -even at the cost of personal freedom s. The natio nalist movement constantly chall enges the governm ent to curtail free speech and go against the European Union 's criteria just as the pro-EU fa cti o ns demand that m o re progress be made towards accession.
It is clear that the nationalist m ovem ent is the driving force behind Article 301 and its counterparts. Who o r what faction serves to gain ti'om hindering Turkey's efforts to accommodate the EU's requirements? There is a m entality in Turkey (not necessarily shared by all Turks, but largely prevalent) of hard-won national pride. Anyone serving to diminish that pride is not only insulting Turkey but any individual w ho is proud to call them selves a T~lrk . Ultra-nationalist factions use this sentiment to gain a stronger g rip on society and attempt to pull Turkey into a reacti onary landslide. It is not so much that Turks do not understand free speech as the ultra-nationalists do not trust it and see it as a tool of "enemies of the state"; Turkey's prevailing govenunent, on the oth er hand, either cannot or does not know h ow to balance their desire to becom e a natio nal economy with a respected presence in the EU with the extremely powelful ultra-natio nalist factions that seek to thwart it. Turkey may be somewhat behind on the accession requirements of the European Unio n but it would be a poor assessment to underestimate them. The Turkish are cognizant of free speech, they just do n 't have much experience with what it can do. Fear of the unknown coupled with the m emory of disastrous political instability create a situation where explo ring the param eters and ramifications of free speech ca use public outcry and reactionary elements to surface. In Turkey, a country who not lo ng ago was ruled by emperors and dictators, freedom of speech will be a slow and painful process. It is clear that there is a drive within Turkey to join its Western neighbors and break free of the stigmas of the Middle East, but there are too few who want this at the cost of b ecoming Western . It is a tangled struggle through which Turkey must emerge whole if it ever hopes to achieve accession. But how W estern can Turkey become before they split apart?
END NOTES
1. "Behold! The number of evil is still 666, not 301", Sunday's Zaman. January 28, 2007. < http://www.sundayszaman .com / sunday/ detaylar.do?load=detay&link=88> .
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